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Making	Sense	of	Austerity:	The	Gendered	Ideas	of	European	
Economic	Policy	
Abstract	
This	paper	focuses	on	the	role	of	gender	in	the	generation	of	coherence	and	legitimacy	of	
austerity,	as	applied	in	the	European	Union.	It	examines	the	rhetorical	defences	of	austerity	
and	unpacks	the	gendered	nature	of	the	reforms	that	austerity	programmes	required.	The	
absence	of	gender	sensitive	analysis	in	policy	making	is	an	absence	that	is	essential	to	both	
the	coherence	and	the	legitimacy	of	austerity.	The	findings	from	this	discourse	analysis	are	a	
direct	contribution	to	the	project	of	understanding	austerity	as	an	ideological	and	political	
phenomenon.	This	project	has,	thus	far,	excluded	such	considerations.		This	analysis	shows	
the,	often	contradictory,	roles	that	gender	plays	in	the	discourse	of	austerity,	highlighting	the	
need	for	research	that	appreciates	the	need	for	such	nuances.	It	also	shows	how	gender	
plays	a	role	in	the	key	economic	arguments	for	austerity,	in	particular	that	of	the	fiscal	
multiplier	and	those	surrounding	labour	market	reforms.	As	austerity	in	the	European	Union	
is	normalised	and	adjusted	in	coming	years,	these	findings	will	continue	to	be	relevant	until	
the	debates	over	austerity	take	gender	seriously.	
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	Austerity	has	been	criticised	as	an	ideological	project,	one	that	relies	on	“deceit”	(Wren-Lewis,	2016)	to	gain	public	support.	It	has	been	described	as	a	policy	which	seeks	to	shrink	the	state,	and	which	is	based	in	fraudulent	economic	analysis	(Krugman,	2013).	While	the	EU	initially	responded	to	the	economic	crisis	through	stimulus	policies,	austerity	quickly	became	the	dominant	approach	prescribed	by	the	European	Commission	in	particular	(Stiglitz,	2016).	In	this	paper,	I	explore	the	role	of	gender	in	the	discourses	of	austerity.	This	paper	contributes	to	the	intellectual	project	of	understanding	the	ideological	underpinnings	of	austerity	(Bartl,	2017;	Blyth,	2013;	Dellepiane-Avellaneda,	2015).	It	brings	a	new	perspective	–	that	of	gender	–	to	a	debate	that	has	currently	viewed	austerity	as	gender-neutral.		Blyth	provides	the	definition	of	austerity	which	I	follow	–	Austerity	is	“a	form	of	voluntary	deflation	in	which	the	economy	adjusts	through	the	reduction	of	wages,	prices	and	public	spending	to	restore	competitiveness,	which	is	(supposedly)	best	achieved	by	cutting	the	state’s	budgets,	debts	and	deficits”	(Blyth,	2013,	p.	2).	This	definition	views	austerity	as	an	intentional	policy	in	itself,	rather	than	as	an	outcome	of	other	policies	(e.g.	as	defined	by	Wren-Lewis	(2016)).	Additionally,	this	definition	can	capture	a	variety	of	policy	decisions.	In	particular,	policies	that	aim	to	lower	the	cost	of	labour	(wages)	are	often	indirect	and	focus	on	decreasing	the	bargaining	power	of	labour.	Blyth’s	definition	captures	such	policies	as	well	as	more	obvious	austerity	measures	such	as	cuts	in	public	services.			At	the	heart	of	the	idea	of	austerity	is	the	theory	of	expansionary	fiscal	contraction	(Dellepiane-Avellaneda,	2015).	This	theory	argues	that	by	cutting	state	spending	
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(contraction),	policy	makers	can	stimulate	growth	(expansion).	It’s	a	counter-intuitive	idea,	and	one	that	has	a	questionable	empirical	record.	A	key	question	of	European	political	economy	is	then:	how	did	the	idea	of	austerity	gain	such	prominence	after	the	crisis	(Hopkin	and	Rosamond,	2017;	Matthijs	and	Blyth,	2016;	Schmidt,	2016a)?	This	paper	explores	the	role	of	gendered	discourses	in	the	adoption,	implementation	and	justification	of	austerity	as	a	policy	programme.	While	feminist	economists	and	political	scientists	have	comprehensively	documented	the	gendered	impacts	of	austerity	(Kantola	and	Lombardo,	2017;	Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013),	both	they	and	political	economists	more	broadly	have	not	explored	how	gender	plays	a	role	in	the	underlying	assumptions	of	the	austerity	approach.	This	paper	instead	explores	how	gender	shapes	and	legitimises	austerity	as	an	economic	programme.			I	begin	by	looking	at	potential	approaches	to	a	gendered	analysis	of	austerity,	outlining	testable	implications	of	a	gendered	austerity	discourse.	I	will	then	examine	three	discursive	processes:	normalisation,	framing	and	congruence	seeking.	By	examining	austerity	from	these	three	angles,	I	can	explore	whether	and	how	the	discourses	of	austerity	are	gendered.	Throughout	I	will	argue	that	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	gender	in	these	discourses	is	key	to	understanding	the	coherence,	and	therefore	the	legitimacy,	of	austerity.	From	the	analysis	presented	in	this	paper	I	will	argue	that	one	of	the	fundamental	reasons	for	the	success	of	the	“seductive	and	dangerous”	(Blyth,	2013,	p.	93)	idea	of	austerity	is	that	it	performs	a	discursive	obfuscation	of	the	gendered	realities	of	the	economy,	and	of	its	material	impacts	on	people,	especially	women,	in	that	economy.			
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Gendered	Austerity	-	Coherence	and	Legitimacy		In	this	section	I	will	set	out	two	sets	of	testable	implications	to	structure	an	investigation	of	the	gendered	nature	of	austerity.	First,	I	discuss	the	gendered	reforms	that	are	central	to	the	application	and	coherence	of	austerity,	and	identify	several	testable	implications,	which	will	be	examined	throughout	the	rest	of	the	paper.	Secondly,	I	will	set	out	the	potential	necessity	of	gendered	silences	for	the	legitimacy	of	austerity,	and	again	I	will	set	out	a	collection	of	potential	observations	that	would	indicate	the	strength	of	such	connections.			The	methodology	utilised	in	this	paper	is	a	critical	discourse	analysis	of	key	documents	and	ideas.	Key	ideas	are	selected	as	they	correspond	to	the	potential	observations	discussed	in	this	section.	In	this	way,	the	methodology	moves	from	feminist	theory	to	the	discourse	analysis.	The	key	document	is	selected	as	a	fairly	representative	example	of	the	justification	of	austerity,	and	I	discuss	further	below	the	merits	of	focusing	on	this	paper.		
Gendered	Reforms	and	the	Coherence	of	Austerity			In	this	section	I	will	outline	how	the	gendered	nature	of	the	economy,	and	therefore	of	any	reforms	to	the	economy,	are	necessary	for	austerity	to	form	a	coherent	economic	programme.	I	will	set	out	testable	implications	for	this	claim,	drawn	from	feminist	political	economy	work	on	austerity	policies	in	the	EU	and	elsewhere.	Austerity	is	not	an	inherently	coherent	economic	idea.	As	discussed	throughout	this	paper,	and	indeed	as	well	documented	by	others	(Blyth,	2013;	Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013;	Krugman,	2013;	Rubery,	2015a;	Wren-Lewis,	2016),	austerity	is	not	sensible,	from	the	point	of	view	of	economic	analysis.	Its	success	is	widely	contested,	and	disputes	over	the	
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empirical	evidence	in	support	of	it	abound	(Krugman,	2013).	There	is	a	lot	required	to	make	it	seem	coherent,	therefore,	and	this	section	sets	out	ways	that	gender	may	be	playing	a	role	in	that	construction	of	it	as	a	coherent	policy.	Simply	put,	these	are	testable	implications	for	whether	or	not	austerity	could	be	presented	as	coherent	without	relying	on	gendered	ideas	and	rhetoric.			Firstly,	women	are	overrepresented	in	public	sector	work,	and	so	are	more	vulnerable	to	cuts	in	pay,	pension	or	other	benefits	(Rubery,	2015a).	In	particular,	women	are	overrepresented	at	the	lower	levels	of	the	public	sector,	where	such	cuts	are	relatively,	if	not	absolutely,	harsher	(Connell	2006).	The	decision	to	prioritise	spending	cuts	over	tax	increases	in	fiscal	consolidation	is	also	gendered.	On	average,	men	pay	more	tax	than	women,	due	to	their	higher	earnings	and	wealth	(Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	Additionally,	there	are	gendered	implications	to	where	tax	increases	fall	–	women	tend	to	have	lower	incomes	and	also	much	lower	wealth	and	assets	(Bettio,	2013;	Spangenberg	et	al.,	2017).	Tax	increases	that	aren’t	progressive,	or	that	don’t	focus	on	assets	as	well	as	income,	tend	to	disproportionally	impact	on	women.		Fiscal	consolidation	decisions	are	therefore	destined	to	be	gendered,	in	that	each	combination	of	spending	cuts	and	tax	increases	will	disproportionately	impact	on	either	men	or	women.	Austerity	is	the	path	that	disadvantages	women	more.			Of	course,	there	are	important	contextual	differences	within	the	gendering	of	austerity.	For	example,	the	extent	to	which	cuts	in	public	services	cause	women	to	take	up	extra	and	unpaid	care	responsibilities	varies	greatly	depending	on	the	pre-existing	gender	norms	and	level	of	workforce	integration.	The	application	of	austerity	has	varied	across	member	states,	and	the	EU	experience	of	austerity	is	also	different	to	that	of	previous	
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applications	of	austerity	globally.	However,	there	is	an	implicit	assumption,	well	established	in	economic	policy,	that	women	can	act	as	a	buffer	demographic	(Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	Women	are	expected	to	take	up	the	slack	resulting	from	public	sector	cuts,	and	are	also	expected	to	smooth	labour	market	contractions	by	exiting	the	workforce	more	quickly	than	men.	While	these	expectations	have	been	born	out	in	previous	contractions	in	other	locations,	it	has	not	been	so	straightforward	in	the	case	of	European	austerity	(Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013;	Rubery,	2015a).	However,	whether	they	are	borne	out	or	not	in	reality,	they	may	be	a	key	part	of	the	discourses	of	austerity.	Later	in	this	paper	I	will	explore	whether	such	discourses	are	implicitly	or	explicitly	relying	on	the	assumption	that	women	can	leave	and	enter	the	workforce	with	little	friction	in	response	to	market	demands.			This	expectation	of	flexibility	is	potentially	gendered	in	that	it	is	women	who	are	expected	to	be	flexible.	But	it	also	a	potentially	gendered	idea	even	when	it	is	broadened	out	to	apply	to	the	workforce	more	generally.	The	actualities	of	flexibility	may	reflect	the	process	of	feminisation	of	the	work	force	that	has	been	observed	in	advanced	capitalist	societies	(Allon,	2014;	Sassen,	2000;	Standing,	1999).	This	accompanies	the	rise	of	the	service	sector	along	with	the	weakening	of	worker	protections.	It	is	not	simply	a	case	of	more	women	entering	the	workforce,	but	of	the	workforce	as	a	whole	being	treated	more	like	women.	I	will	examine	whether	the	idea	of	flexibility	espoused	by	the	austerity	discourse	follows	this	approach.			Despite	nuances	to	the	actual	effects	of	austerity,	the	generalised	assumption	about	women	as	a	buffer	work-and-care	force	is	a	potentially	key	component	in	the	coherence	of	austerity.	A	central	expectation	of	the	philosophy	of	austerity	is	the	response	of	the	
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private	market	to	the	retreat	of	the	public	sector.	Put	simply,	advocates	of	austerity	argue	that	the	retreat	of	the	state,	through	spending	cuts,	will	“free	up”	space	for	the	market	to	grow.		While	most	of	the	public	rhetoric	around	this	point	focuses	on	entrepreneurship	and	growth	of	private	sector	businesses,	there	is	an	additional	assumption	concerning	the	role	of	the	state	in	“crowding	out”	unpaid	care	work.	According	to	the	austerity	philosophy	then,	cuts	in	state	spending	can	be	(more	than)	offset	by	growth	of	private	providers.	However,	more	implicitly,	austerity	also	expects	families	and	communities	to	fill	the	gaps	created	by	cuts	to	state	spending.		This	assumption	was	famously	articulated	in	the	“Big	Society”	slogan	of	the	British	Conservative	party	(Bramall,	2013).	It	is	the	idea	that	there	is	an	available	resource	of	unpaid	care	workers,	and	it	underpins	the	philosophy	of	austerity	(Bramall,	2013).	It	often	coincides	with	a	rise	in	traditionalist	rhetoric	around	gender	roles,	and	in	particular,	the	caring	role	of	women	(Kantola	and	Lombardo,	2017;	Strolovitch,	2013).			Without	this	assumption,	austerity	is	a	policy	that	is	intentionally	removing	critical	supports	for	vulnerable	people	without	any	replacement.	While,	often,	this	is	what	austerity	means	in	practice,	the	rhetorical	coherence	of	austerity	as	a	political	position	requires	the	underlying	assumption	of	a	reserve	force	of	women	ready	to	replace	expensive	public	services	(Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	This	gendered	assumption	could	be	seen	in	direct	reference	to	the	offsetting	by	families	and	communities,	and	also	through	the	absence	of	concern	for	the	removal	of	state	funded	supports.		Later	in	this	paper,	I	will	examine	whether	and	how	this	assumption	presents	in	the	discourses	of	European	Economic	Governance.			
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Finally,	the	impacts	of	austerity	are	not	universal	to	either	gender.	Women	of	colour	are	hit	even	harder	by	such	cuts;	likewise	women	who	are	already	economically	vulnerable	are	particular	affected.	Migrant	women	who	had	found	employment	in	domestic	work	are	also	particularly	disadvantaged	(Annesley	and	Scheele,	2011;	Strolovitch,	2013).	These	racialised	impacts	of	austerity	result	from	the	pre-existing	racial	disparities	in	the	economy	and	society	(Emejulu	and	Bassel,	2017).	Such	an	intersectional	understanding	of	the	impacts	of	austerity	highlights	just	how	much	the	dominant	narrative	of	EU	economic	policy	is	excluding	nuance.	Such	exclusions	can	be	described	as	“strategic	silences”	(Bakker,	1994).	This	label	captures	the	erasure,	but	also	the	benefits	of	such	erasures	to	the	dominant	policy	narrative.		In	the	next	section,	I’ll	explore	the	role	of	such	silences.			
Gender	Blind	Economics	and	the	Legitimacy	of	Austerity		Gender	inequalities	have	persisted	and	worsened	under	the	new	economic	governance	regime	(Bettio,	2013).	That	austerity	has	gendered	impacts	is	a	well	evidenced	conclusion	(see	for	example:	Annesley	and	Scheele,	2011;	Bettio,	2013;	Elomaki,	2012;	Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	Rather	than	disputing	this,	however,	the	defenders	of	austerity	exclude	consideration	of	such	impacts.	This	exclusion,	and	the	corresponding	normalisation	of	the	gender	blind	economic	analysis	(O’Dwyer,	2016),	is	crucial	for	presenting	austerity	as	a	coherent	economic	policy.	The	particular	form	of	fiscal	consolidation	dictated	by	austerity	is	gendered.	While	economic	downturns	in	general	tend	to	have	gendered	dimensions,	resulting	from	gender	segregation	in	the	labour	market	and	existing	vulnerability	and	wealth	disparities	(Annesley	and	Scheele,	2011;	Elson,	1999;	Rubery,	2015b),	austerity	is	gendered	in	a	further	way.	Since	the	specific	policies	required	by	an	austerity	approach	tend	to	concentrate	on	cuts	to	public	
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spending	(Ban,	2015;	Blyth,	2013;	Rubery,	2015b),	they	impact	women	to	a	greater	extent	than	men.	This	is	because	women	are	more	vulnerable	to	cuts	in	public	spending.	They	are	more	likely,	due	to	their	over-representation	in	care	work,	to	rely	on	public	supports	such	as	child	benefits	and	other	family	payments,	or	carer	allowances	(Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	They	are	also	more	likely	to	do	additional	care	work	in	the	family	or	the	community	as	a	result	of	cuts	to	publicly	provided	services	(Elomaki,	2012;	Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2013).	The	coherence	of	austerity	requires	that	it	be	presented	as	technocratic	economic	policy,	however.	So	this	clear	distributive	question	must	be	ignored	in	order	for	austerity	to	be	promoted	in	this	way.	This	construction	of	austerity	as	a	gender-neutral	economic	approach	is	therefore	the	first	key	indicator	of	the	role	of	gender	silences	in	providing	legitimacy	for	austerity.	This	construction	can	take	place	within	the	wider	context	of	a	discourse	of	gender-neutral	economic	policy,	or	can	be	particular	to	austerity.			A	particular	avenue	for	analysis	of	these	silences	is	to	examine	how	and	where	suffering	or	hardship	is	acknowledged	and	discussed	in	the	discourse	of	austerity.	Are	the	disproportionate	impacts	on	women,	in	particular	already	vulnerable	women,	highlighted	or	obscured?	This	analysis	can	even	go	back	to	the	crisis	itself.	The	crisis	is	constructed	around	narratives	of	economic	hardships.	However,	as	has	been	pointed	out	in	both	the	US	and	EU	context,	the	depiction	of	such	difficulties	is	not	neutral	(Emejulu	and	Bassel,	2017;	Strolovitch,	2013).	The	economic	struggles	of	women,	and	in	particular	minority	women,	do	not	signify	a	crisis.	Additionally,	the	increases	in	hardship	faced	by	such	groups	may	not	be	seen	to	be	an	issue	of	concern	for	policy	makers.	This	paper	will	explore	whose	experiences	are	deemed	important	through	the	
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discourse	of	austerity,	and	test	whether	there	is	a	strategic	silencing,	or	excluding	of	the	experiences	of	certain	groups.			Finally,	the	very	economic	models	of	austerity	may	require	silences	about	gender	in	order	to	seem	appropriate	and	legitimate.	Economic	models	reflect	the	assumptions	about	the	economy	and	society	of	those	who	create	and	use	them.	Given	the	current	intense	debates	over	the	economic	models	used	by	the	Commission	in	particular,	I	will	explore	where	gender	silences	were	part	of	the	biases	at	play	in	their	construction.	I	will	focus	on	a	particular	aspect	of	the	models,	that	of	the	fiscal	multiplier,	and	explore	where	the	analysis	of	the	fiscal	multiplier	relied	upon	by	austerity	was	underpinned	by	assumptions	of	a	gender-free	economy.			
Normalising	Austerity	through	Gendered	Reforms	and	Gendered	Silences		In	this	section	I	will	explore	the	gendered	nature	of	the	normalisation	of	austerity.	Bakker’s	concept	of	the	“strategic	silence”	(Bakker,	1994)	is	very	useful	here.	Bakker	describes	such	silences	as	strategic	in	that	they	help	to	support	the	legitimacy	of	dominant	ideologies	–	she	argues	that	gender	is	not	absent	by	accident,	but	that	such	absences	are	in	fact	a	key	factor	in	the	discursive	embedding	of	economic	policies.	Here	I	explore	where	there	are	such	“strategic	silences”	at	play	in	European	Economic	Governance.			A	primary	defender	of	the	EU’s	economic	policy	within	the	European	Commission	is	Marco	Buti.	Buti	has	headed	up	the	Directorate	General	of	Economic	and	Financial	
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Affairs	since	the	end	of	2008,	before	that	he	was	the	deputy	head1.	He	has	published	widely	on	economic	policy,	and	is	one	of	the	few	architects	of	European	Economic	Governance	to	explicitly	use	the	term	austerity	in	his	defences	of	European	Economic	Governance.	In	a	ECFIN	economic	brief	published	by	the	commission	in	2013,	entitled	“The	Debate	on	Fiscal	Policy	in	Europe:	beyond	the	Austerity	Myth”	(hereafter,	“Austerity	Myth”)	Buti	and	his	co-author	Carnot	took	on	what	he	referred	to	as	the	“austerity	myth”	(Buti	and	Carnot,	2013).	In	this	paper	he	describes	austerity	policy	as	the	only	option	available	to	policy	makers,	and	presents	a	story	where	policy	makers	only	had	a	choice	with	regards	to	the	extent	and	timing	of	austerity	applied.			This	paper	also	reflects	the	wider	arguments	made	by	Buti	in	academic	articles	and	on	economics	focused	blogs,	such	as	VOXeu.	What	is	particularly	interesting	about	Buti	is	that	he	does	not	seem	to	be	committed	to	the	underlying	idea	of	expansionary	fiscal	contradiction.	In	this	paper,	this	is	clear	in	how	austerity	is	defended	against	critique,	as	the	only	available	option,	rather	than	celebrated	as	the	most	desirable	option.	For	all	of	these	reasons	this	is	a	useful	paper	for	analysis	of	the	austerity	discourse,	which	I	will	return	to	again	in	this	paper.	All	of	this	is	not	to	say	that	Buti,	or	this	paper	itself,	are	fully	representative	of	the	entirety	of	thinking	around	austerity	within	DG	ECFIN.	The	working	paper	series,	for	example,	publishes	a	diverse	collection	of	work.	Indeed,	there	have	even	been	some	papers	that	have	addressed	specifically	or	tangentially	gendered	aspects	of	economic	policy.	However,	in	choosing	this	paper	I	have	identified	a	paper	that	is	participating	in	the	wider	debate	about	austerity	specifically.	It	is	this	role	of	the	paper	in	responding	to	critique	that	makes	it	particularly	interesting,	and	it	also	makes	
																																																								1	https://ec.europa.eu/info/persons/director-general-marco-buti_en	
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it	a	slightly	more	encompassing	paper	than	some	others	from	the	series.	While	an	analysis	of	the	gendered	assumptions	across	the	Commissions	thinking	about	economic	policy	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	the	approach	demonstrated	here	could	potentially	lead	to	such	an	analysis.			Austerity	is	normalised	through	the	obfuscation	of	its	gender	dynamics.	The	story	of	austerity	told	in	the	“Austerity	Myth”	paper	relies	on	implicit	assumptions	about	the	availability	and	adaptability	of	workers.	This	narrative	of	a	cohort	of	workers	able	to	cushion	the	number	of	“outright	layoffs”	is	a	classic	example	of	the	assumption	of	women	as	a	buffer	work	force	discussed	above.	A	gender	blind	analysis	of	austerity,	such	as	that	offered	in	Buti’s	paper	and	by	a	significant	majority	of	the	documentation	of	the	European	Semester	(O’Dwyer,	2016),	is	able	to	call	on	such	gendered	assumptions	of	the	economy	without	ever	explicitly	addressing	them.	In	this	paper,	flexibility	is	praised,	but	the	facts	of	the	gender	pay	gap	and	workplace	discrimination	against	women	is	omitted	and	hence	this	absence	is	a	key	part	of	generating	the	coherence	of	austerity	–	an	account	of	austerity	that	captured	its	gendered	nature	and	impacts	would	be	far	more	difficult	to	defend.			In	“the	Austerity	Myth”,	Buti	and	Carnot	respond	to	the	criticism	that	austerity	requires	unfair	adjustments	and	that	the	reforms	required	by	austerity	are	not	sustainable	or	fair.	The	paper	argues	that	structural	reforms	under	austerity	can	in	fact	make	economies	more	resilient	to	shocks,	“structural	reforms	can	alter	not	only	the	efficiency	with	which	economies	respond	to	shocks,	but	also	the	distribution	of	the	effects”	(Buti	and	Carnot,	2013).	This	is,	clearly,	true.	However,	it	is	not	clear	in	which	direction	these	distributional	changes	go.	In	fact,	the	turn	to	austerity	in	responding	to	the	crisis	has	
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altered	the	distribution	of	suffering,	pushing	it	onto	women	and	the	economically	vulnerable	(Bruff	and	Wöhl,	2016;	Elomaki,	2012;	Kantola	and	Lombardo,	2017).	This	rhetoric	which	hides	the	disproportionate	suffering	of	women	and	marginalised	groups	reflects	the	gendered	and	racialised	discourses	observed	in	the	US	housing	crisis,	leading	some	to	ask	who’s	suffering	constitutes	a	crisis,	and	whose	is	to	be	expected	and	ignored	(Emejulu	and	Bassel,	2017;	Strolovitch,	2013).			Throughout	this	paper,	and	the	wider	publications	of	the	DG	ECFIN,	there	are	attempts	to	respond	to	the	criticisms	of	austerity,	of	which	there	has	been	no	shortage.	Nowhere	amongst	these	official	defences,	however,	is	there	a	response	to	the	criticism	of	gendered	austerity.	This	is	in	spite	of	a	substantial	literature	evidencing	the	gendered	impacts	of	austerity	across	member	states,	and	indeed	in	previous	experiences	of	austerity	worldwide.	Within	the	EU	institutions,	both	the	Parliament	and	the	Commission	have	published	reports	documented	the	impact	of	austerity	on	both	gender	equality	policies	and	women’s	lives	(Bettio,	2013;	European	Parliament,	2013).		The	lack	of	engagement	with	such	documents	by	economic	policy	makers	reflects	the	side-lining	of	gender	expertise	identified	in	European	Economic	Governance	(Cavaghan,	2017;	O’Dwyer,	2017).	But	their	existence	suggests	that	the	gender-blind	accounts	of	austerity	are	not	accidental.	It	reflects	the	make-up	of	the	audiences	for	these	reports	and	papers.	In	seeking	legitimacy	for	the	programme	of	austerity,	convincing	feminist	groups	and	those	concerned	with	the	impacts	of	austerity	on	women	and	other	marginalised	groups	are	not	the	priority.	Indeed,	in	tracing	the	fortunes	of	austerity,	it	becomes	clear	who	is	such	a	prioritised	audience.	I	discuss	this	further	below,	in	the	final	section.		
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	This	discussion	of	austerity	highlights	how	women	are	forced	by	the	reforms	into	playing	the	role	of	the	buffer	workforce,	and	also	highlights	the	silencing	of	the	suffering	of	some	groups.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	explore	how	the	framing	of	austerity	also	relies	on	assumptions	about	gender,	and	the	exclusion	of	gender	sensitive	economic	analysis.			
Framing	Austerity	Through	Gender		This	section	will	discuss	two	important	frameworks	that	enabled	the	application	of	austerity.	Frameworks	structure	policy	debate,	and	establish	the	underlying	assumptions	of	such	a	debate.	As	such,	understanding	these	frames	is	crucial	in	coming	to	understand	how	and	why	austerity	was	adopted,	and	why	much	contradictory	evidence	on	its	capacity	for	generating	growth	was	excluded.	Here	I	discuss	the	frame	of	flexibility,	and	argue	that	is	used	to	obscure	a	key	contradiction	of	austerity.	Secondly,	I	examine	the	framing	of	a	key	economic	idea,	the	fiscal	multiplier,	and	show	it	requires	the	assumptions	of	gender-blind	economics	to	be	legitimate.		
The	Flexibility	Frame	and	Austerity	Flexibility	is	a	keyword	of	the	discourse	of	austerity.	It	appears	in	many	of	the	key	documents	arguing	for	an	austerity	response	to	the	crisis,	as	documented	below,	and	also	is	found	repeatedly	throughout	the	Country	Specific	Recommendations	(CSRs)	(Clauwaert,	2015).	In	this	context,	flexibility	means	the	ease	with	which	employment	circumstances	can	change.	It	captures	the	ability	for	people	to	enter	the	workforce	and	change	jobs,	but	it	also	captures	the	ability	of	employers	to	adjust	the	number	of	workers	they	employ	with	less	friction	or	costs,	or	to	reduce	or	increase	the	hours	worked	by	those	workers.	In	this	section	I	explore	the	relationship	between	this	framing	of	austerity	reforms	as	flexibility	and	the	coherence	of	austerity	more	broadly.	I	
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then	examine	flexibility	in	two	key	documents	of	European	austerity,	and	in	an	examination	of	a	year	of	the	CSRs.	The	key	point	of	this	section	is	that	the	idea	of	flexibility	is	both	gendered	and	essential	to	the	austerity	discourse.			For	the	structural	reforms	of	the	European	austerity	programmes	to	be	successful,	flexibility	in	the	labour	force	must	be	possible.	If	there	were	not	sufficient	flexibility,	nor	the	possibility	of	creating	such	flexibility,	then	many	of	the	structural	reforms	would	lead	to	unemployment,	and	therefore	to	a	productivity	gap	and	to	low	or	negative	growth.	For	austerity	to	be	believed	to	deliver	growth	through	such	reforms	therefore	requires	the	idea	of	flexibility.	In	this	way	flexibility	is	a	prior	idea,	a	frame,	through	which	austerity	is	advocated.	Flexibility,	whether	existing	or	potential,	is	therefore	essential	for	austerity’s	coherence	and	legitimacy		Indeed,	flexibility	is	tied	to	another	keyword,	competitiveness.	Throughout	the	documents	of	European	semester,	recommendations	concerning	flexibility	are	justified	as	increasing	competiveness.		This	relationship	is	particularly	salient	in	the	context	of	members	of	the	Eurozone.	Competitiveness	cannot	be	derived	from	currency	devaluations,	and	so	“internal	devaluations”	are	needed.	Internal	devaluations	are	meant	to	make	economies	more	competitive	by	lowering	the	prices	of	their	goods	and	exports.	Devaluation	is	often	done	through	adjustments	in	the	currency	levels	–	making	exports	to	other	currencies	more	competitive.	However,	since	members	of	the	Eurozone	cannot	make	such	adjustments,	prices	must	be	reduced	in	another	away,	through	“internal	devaluations”.	Internal	devaluations	are	a	process	of	downward	wage	pressures	that	are	supposed	to	increase	global	competiveness.	Goods	(and	services)	become	more	competitive	when	they	cost	less,	so	wages	paid	to	workers	involved	in	
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their	production	must	be	reduced	in	the	pursuit	of	competitiveness.	Wage	reductions	are	constricted	by	existing	employment	agreements	and	labour	laws,	so	flexibility	is	required	to	bring	this	cost	of	labour	down.	Increasing	the	hours	worked	by	employees,	or	shifting	employees	to	part	time	work,	provides	this	flexibility.	Additionally,	lessening	the	costs	to	employers	in	making	employees	redundant	is	exactly	the	type	of	flexibility	that	enables	this	price-lowering	drive	to	competitiveness.		If	this	flexibility	were	not	part	of	the	reforms	of	austerity,	the	growth	required	to	justify	austerity	would	be	much	more	difficult	to	stimulate,	and	to	predict	in	the	economic	modelling	of	austerity.	Thus,	flexibility	is	essential	for	austerity	to	make	sense,	to	be	coherent.			I	return	to	the	“Austerity	Myth”	paper	to	examine	how	flexibility	is	used	to	promote	austerity.	Buti	and	Carnot	celebrate	that	austerity	leads	to	flexibility,	stating	that	“flexible	work	arrangements	and	lower	nominal	rigidities	reduce	the	impact	of	downturns	on	outright	layoffs”	(Buti	and	Carnot,	2013).	This	claim	is	their	response	to	the	criticism	of	austerity	as	unsustainable.	They	are	arguing	that	austerity	creates	flexibility	in	the	labour	market	that	can	prevent	increases	in	unemployment.	Put	more	directly,	they	argue	that	austerity	reforms	lead	to	lower	wages	and	increases	in	part	time	work.	Indeed,	what	is	being	described	here	is	the	feminization	of	the	workforce	(Allon,	2014;	Sassen,	2000;	Standing,	1999)	–	flexibility	implies	non-unionised	workers,	with	lower	or	less	protected	wages	(less	nominal	rigidities).	The	greater	the	feminization	of	the	labour	force,	the	easier	it	is	to	cut	wages,	or	require	longer	work	for	the	same	pay.	Feminization	of	labour	captures	both	the	increasing	presence	of	women	in	the	workplace,	and	the	changing	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	employer	and	employee,	shifting	the	standards	once	enjoyed	by	secure,	mostly	male,	employees,	to	those	endured	by	less	secure,	mostly	female,	employees.	Women	already	make	up	the	
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majority	of	part	time	and	low	paid	workers,	and	the	advocacy	of	flexibility	argues,	often	implicitly,	that	more	work	should	become	similar.	Additionally,	such	flexibility	is	likely	to	develop	in	female	dominated	industries	more	easily	than	in	male	dominated	industries,	since	such	industries	tend	to	have	less	protections	and	trade	union	affiliations.	Flexibility,	which	is	supposed	to	temper	the	unemployment	caused	by	austerity,	and	therefore	to	protect	its	coherence	as	an	economic	policy,	is	gendered	both	in	that	it	relies	on	a	feminisation	of	labour,	and	is	gendered	in	its	impacts.		In	the	Country	Specific	Reports	(CSRs)	for	2014,	flexibility	of	the	labour	market	is	mentioned	in	the	recommendations	for	18	of	27	member	states.	Workforce	activation	is	mentioned	in	all	27	of	the	reports.	Workforce	activation	captures	both	the	supply	and	demand	factors	of	labour	market.	As	such,	workforce	activation	recommendations	include	incentives	to	employers	to	hire	more,	in	particular	at	the	entry	or	junior	level.	But	workforce	activation	also	incorporates	measures	to	encourage	people,	in	particular	women	and	young	people,	to	enter	the	labour	market,	such	as	improving	access	to	childcare,	or	reducing	benefits	for	non-workers.		The	two	are	often	connected,	with	flexibility	the	recommended	mechanism	for	achieving	workforce	activation.			It	is	important	to	be	very	clear	about	how	flexibility	is	used	in	these	documents,	and	in	the	wider	programme	of	economic	reforms.	Different	flexibility	measures	can	have	very	different	impacts,	in	particular	on	gender	equality	and	in	terms	of	disproportionate	impacts	on	one	gender.	Flexibility	of	employers	could	be	very	welcome,	for	example,	in	enabling	parents	to	enter	or	remain	in	the	workforce	while	faced	with	various	care	responsibilities	However,	that	is	not	the	type	of	flexibility	that	is	the	focus	in	the	European	Semester.	Flexibility	is	predominately	sought	from	employees.		
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	Within	the	recommendations,	there	is	a	clear	aim	of	increasing	women’s	labour	force	participation.	Under	this	aim,	there	are	two	interconnected	recommendations	proposed	repeatedly.	The	documents	propose	increasing	the	incentives	for	women	to	enter	the	workforce.	This	is	to	be	done	through	a	combination	of	increasing	the	availability	of	childcare,	and	through	the	removal	of	financial	disincentives	for	second	earners.	For	example,	in	2014	the	recommendations	for	Italy	suggest	that	the	government	“adopt	effective	action	to	promote	female	employment,	by	adopting	measures	to	reduce	fiscal	disincentives	for	second	earners…and	providing	adequate	care	services”	(Commission,	2014).	This	means,	in	practice,	removing	benefits	that	may	encourage	or	facilitate	women	to	stay	at	home,	while	also	increasing	the	level	of	childcare	offered,	primarily	through	private	provision.	Within	the	2014	CSRs,	there	is	no	recognition	of	the	impact	that	austerity	has	had	on	pre-existing	childcare	practices,	or	on	the	shifts	in	financial	incentives	created	by	flexibility	in	the	workforce.	Flexibility	reforms,	including	those	recommended	under	the	European	semester,	and	indeed	in	the	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding’	agreed	by	member	states	that	were	part	of	bail	out	programmes,	can	often	shift	the	incentives	for	second	earners	–	working	fewer	hours	or	for	lower	wages	can	easily	mean	that	wages	don’t	cover	childcare	costs.	This	approach	to	flexibility	highlights	the	contradictions	of	austerity	when	it	comes	to	women	and	the	labour	force.	Policies	of	cutting	public	services	and	lowering	wages	push	women	out	of	work,	and	yet	women	are	expected	to	enter	the	workforce	to	increase	growth.	Additionally,	the	working	conditions	that	result	from	the	emphasis	on	flexibility	may	end	up	being	less	suitable	for	people	with	care	responsibilities,	while	the	supports	for	people	who	choose	to	focus	on	those	responsibilities	may	simultaneously	be	reduced.	The	keyword	of	
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flexibility	is	then	a	rhetorical	tool	for	obscuring	this	contradiction,	and	is	therefore	central	to	the	coherence	of	austerity.		
Framing	Austerity	Models:	The	Story	of	Fiscal	Multipliers		At	the	core	of	the	debate	over	austerity	is	the	question	of	whether	cuts	to	government	spending	really	can	lead	to	growth.	This	question	boils	down	to	the	idea	of	the	fiscal	multiplier.	The	fiscal	multiplier	is	the	extent	to	which	changes	in	government	spending	or	taxation	impact	on	growth.	It	applies	to	both	cases	of	increases	in	spending	or	tax	cuts,	and	in	spending	cuts	or	tax	increases.	The	theory	of	austerity	holds	that	this	number	is	low	as	a	result	of	spending	cuts:	reductions	in	government	spending	encourage	private	sector	activity,	and	so	the	fiscal	multiplier	is	somewhere	below	1	(Blanchard	and	Leigh,	2014).	As	a	result	of	this	theory,	the	economic	models	used	in	European	Economic	Governance	(and,	indeed,	by	other	international	institutions),	included	an	assumption	of	a	fiscal	multiplier	of	between	0.5	and	1.	It	is	now	clear	that	such	assumptions	were	wrong,	and	were	a	major	contributory	factor	in	the	over-estimating	of	the	potential	for	growth	resulting	from	austerity.	Subsequent	analysis	of	the	actual	effects	of	austerity	put	the	number	of	the	multiplier	closer	to	3	(Blanchard	and	Leigh,	2013,	2014).	It	is	now	clear	that	the	fiscal	multiplier	varies	significantly	across	countries	and	time.	In	particular,	the	level	of	interest	rates	has	a	substantial	impact	on	the	level	of	multiplier.	Austerity	applied	in	the	context	of	interest	rates	that	were	at,	or	close	to,	zero,	has	been	shown	to	have	a	stronger	multiplier	effect	than	in	more	“normal”	times	when	interest	rates	were	higher	(Wren-Lewis,	2016).			The	fiscal	multiplier	is	gendered	due	to	the	fact	that	not	all	cuts	or	increases	result	in	the	same	multiplier.	Due	to	the	segregated	nature	of	the	economy,	austerity	can	be	
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deeply	gendered,	as	discussed	above.	However,	research	has	shown	in	the	context	of	spending	increases,	that	targeting	care	work	and	social	infrastructure	more	broadly	can	have	a	greater	(positive)	multiplier	effect	that	investment	in	physical	infrastructure	or	energy.	One	study	even	found	that	investment	in	the	female	dominated	care	sector	can	generate	up	to	twice	as	many	new	jobs,	for	the	same	level	of	investment	in	male	dominated	industries	such	as	construction	(Antonopoulos	et	al.,	2010;	Perrons,	2017).	As	the	application	of	austerity	has	involved	cuts	to	social	infrastructure,	it	is	possible	that	a	similar	gendered	dynamic	is	playing	out,	contributing	to	the	much	higher	multiplier	effect	than	predicted.		Austerity	then,	requires	the	assumption	of	a	gender-neutral	economy	in	order	to	be	coherent	as	a	policy	response	to	recession.	It	is	only	through	the	absence	of	a	gendered	understanding	of	consumer	behaviour,	debt	and	recession	dynamics	that	theory	of	expansionary	fiscal	contractions	could	make	sense.		The	debate	over	the	fiscal	multiplier	has	highlighted	the	frames	that	structure	austerity	arguments.	For	example,	the	level	of	recession	of	an	economy	was	not	properly	considered,	and	expectations	were	based	on	experiences	of	cutbacks	in	non-recessionary	economies.	While	the	IMF	in	particular	has	begun	to	focus	on	some	of	these	assumptions,	there	are	also	gendered	assumptions	that	shape	the	fiscal	multiplier	theory	and	expectations.	Firstly,	the	reason	that	the	level	of	recession	and	the	level	of	interest	rates	influence	the	fiscal	multiplier	is	because	they	influence	the	behaviour	of	investors,	employers	and	consumers.	A	combination	of	credit	or	capital	availability	and	the	expectations	of	economic	actors	dictates	how	much,	or	indeed	whether,	people	or	companies	will	spend.	In	generating	the	expected	fiscal	multiplier	to	model	the	impacts	of	austerity,	assumptions	about	people’s	willingness	and	ability	to	take	on	debt	are	made.		
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	Decades	of	feminist	research	point	out	that,	due	to	their	different	positions	within	the	economy,	men	and	women	interact	with	credit	and	debt	differently	(Elson,	1991,	2004;	Guerrina,	2017;	Perrons,	2015).	Women	are	less	likely	to	be	able	to	secure	credit,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	including	gendered	assumptions	about	credit-worthiness	and	a	lower	likelihood	to	hold	assets.	Despite	this,	the	modelling	of	the	fiscal	multiplier	done	by	the	EU	and	other	institutions	does	not	take	gender	into	account	at	all.	The	models	rely	on	a	conceptualisation	of	the	“representative	consumer”	(Bakker,	1994;	Ferber	and	Nelson,	2009),	which	should	capture	any	variations	in	actual	behaviour.	The	absence	of	any	consideration	of	the	gendered	dimensions	of	consumer	behaviour	in	these	models	reflects	the	broader	economic	assumptions	that	imagine	a	gender-less	world.	Gender	is	yet	another	element	of	context	that	was	missing	from	the	models	of	austerity.	As	such,	the	assumption	of	a	gender	blind	economy	frames	the	construction,	use	and	discussion	of	such	economic	models.	This	means	that	for	such	models,	and	the	discussions	they	shape,	to	be	coherent,	there	must	be	an	assumption	of	a	gender	free	economy.			Of	course,	gender	considerations	are	not	the	only	factor	that	was	excluded	in	order	to	make	austerity	coherent.	Worryingly,	however,	in	the	debates	that	are	currently	seeking	to	nuance	understandings	of	the	multiplier,	gender	remains	absent.	As	the	economic	governance	regime	developed	in	response	to	the	crisis	becomes	embedded	and	normalised,	this	question	of	the	fiscal	multiplier	remains	significant.	Indeed,	it	frames	the	current	debates	over	economic	policy,	and	such	debates	will	remain	partial	if	they	continue	to	exclude	any	understanding	of	the	gendered	nature	of	the	economy.			
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Austerity	and	Congruence:	From	Consensus	to	Controversy		
“But	we	would	say	that	more	often	than	not,	these	recommendations	
have	been	and	remain	sensible	and	in	line	with	those	advocated	by	other	
institutional	organisations	such	as	the	IMF	or	the	OECD”	(Buti	and	
Carnot,	2013)		Austerity	has	been	a	highly	contested	policy	programme	and	philosophy.	As	such,	the	congruence	of	austerity	with	the	wider	norms	of	the	audiences	addressed	by	Commission	and	others	promoting	austerity	was	always	in	doubt.	Congruence	is	the	process	of	connecting	an	idea	with	already	existing	and	widely	accepted	norms	.	Congruence	has	previously	been	used	in	work	addressing	the	puzzles	created	in	the	context	of	neoliberal	policy	making	and	the	ideas	of	austerity:	why	and	how	did	these	ideas	become	so	entrenched	as	to	survive	both	the	crisis	moment	and	increasing	contestation	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis?	Congruence	is	one	of	the	key	factors	identified	in	the	study	of	the	resilience	of	neoliberalism	(Schmidt	and	Thatcher,	2014).			As	the	EU	seeks	to	legitimise	the	new	power	dynamics	of	economic	governance	that	have	emerged	since	the	crisis,	they	must	present	such	changes	as	complying	with	a	generally	shared	set	of	assumptions	about	the	purpose	of	policy	and	economics	more	broadly.	This	involves	the	communication	of	economic	policy	through	existing	standardised	language	(jargon)	and	formats,	such	as	statistical	analysis	or	through	reference	to	widely	used	economic	models.	This	is	a	discursive	practice	that	seeks	to	embed	European	economic	policy	within	wider	norms	of	economic	policy.	These	types	of	connective	discourse	are	not	limited	to	economics.	For	example,	in	other	epistemic	communities	the	use	of	map	scales,	the	reliance	on	certain	key	sources,	and	jargon	or	other	specialised	communications	are	seen	creates	a	self-reinforcing	practice	of	setting	
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the	boundaries	on	debate	and	contestation,	and	in	stabilising	existing	practices,	approaches	and	bodies	of	knowledge.			In	this	final	section	I	explore	the	role	of	the	explicit	appeals	to	authority	of	international	economic	organisations	in	establishing	the	congruence	of	austerity.	Here	I	identify	how	the	gendered	nature	of	austerity	at	the	EU	level	is	not	unique	to	Europe,	and	that	in	fact	European	austerity	is	congruent	with	a	global	narrative	of	austerity	that	obfuscates	gendered	impacts	and	invokes	gendered	stereotypes.	However,	I	will	also	explore	how	the	congruence	of	austerity	was	destabilised	by	changes	in	the	international	consensus.	This	shift	of	the	Commission	away	from	the	language,	and	even	the	practices,	of	austerity	(Schmidt,	2016b)	highlights	how	necessary	such	congruence	is.	It	also	highlights	which	groups	or	actors	were	necessary	for	congruence	–	as	changes	in	the	views	of	the	IMF	and	other	global	economic	actors	created	incentives	change,	whereas	the	consistent	opposition	to	austerity	from	feminist	groups	or	more	gender-sensitive	international	actors	did	not	seem	to	threaten	the	congruence	of	austerity.			I	return	to	Buti	and	Carnot	and	their	article	against	the	“austerity	myth.”	They	argue	repeatedly	that	the	austerity	measures	they	are	defending	are	in	line	with	international	practice.	This	explicit	appeal	to	such	authority	is	a	key	example	of	congruence	at	work.	Indeed,	the	output	legitimacy	of	austerity	policies	has	seen	its	greatest	challenge	arising	from	the	fracturing	of	this	international	consensus,	as	the	IMF	in	particular	began	to	question	the	economic	rational	for	austerity	(Elliott,	2016).	The	previously	unanimous	agreement	on	austerity	was	deeply	political,	however.	As	Blyth	and	others	have	documented,	the	work	of	a	particular	network	economists	was	key	to	adoption	of	austerity	(Blyth,	2013;	Dellepiane-Avellaneda,	2015;	Helgadóttir,	2016).	What	I	have	
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argued	here	is	that,	in	addition	to	the	influence	of	certain	economists,	the	gender	dynamics	of	austerity	also	played	a	role.			Amongst	the	networks	of	global	and	regional	economic	management,	gender	concerns	are	side-lined,	if	they	are	addressed	at	all	(Guerrina,	2017;	Schuberth	and	Young,	2011;	Walby,	2015;	Weiner	and	MacRae,	2014).	This	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	application	of	austerity	in	Europe.	Counterfactually,	if	institutions	such	and	the	IMF	and	the	OECD	were	to	be	engaged	in	understanding	the	gendered	nature	of	the	economy,	and	in	evaluating	the	impacts	of	policies	on	gender	and	other	equalities,	the	defences	of	European	austerity	would	face	a	difficulty	in	finding	congruence,	as	it	does	not	engage	in	such	analysis.	Such	an	engagement	with	the	empirical	evidence	of	the	gendered	nature	of	the	economy	would	require	adopting	a	gender	sensitive	analysis	of	austerity	in	Europe	and	defending	the	disproportionate	impacts	on	women,	The	exclusion	of	comprehensive	gender	analysis,	at	the	global	and	European	level	is	a	“strategic	silence”	(Bakker,	1994)	at	both	levels,	as	each	provides	congruence	for	the	other.	Tracing	the	shift	in	the	discourse	of	European	economic	policies	shows	which	concerns	are	prioritised.	Comparing	“the	Austerity	Myth”	to	more	recent	papers	on	economic	governance,	such	as	the	Five	Presidents’	Report	(Junker	and	others,	2015),	shows	which	criticisms	were	taken	on	board.	The	Five	Presidents’	Report	abandons	all	mentions	of	austerity,	of	expansionary	fiscal	consolidation.	Instead	it	talks	of	growth	from	investments	such	as	the	Junker	fund,	and	through	education	and	innovation	(Junker	and	others,	2015).	However,	in	moving	past	the	rhetoric	of	austerity,	it	continues	to	offer	a	gender	blind	account	of	the	economy,	and	continues	to	obfuscate	the	disproportionate	hardship	and	indeed	suffering	of	women	and	marginalised	groups.	This	highlights	that	output	legitimacy	is	indeed	sought	from	specific	constituencies	–	that	of	the	
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international	economic	policy	community.	That	such	a	community	also	relies	on	assumptions	of	gender	blind	economics	meant	that	there	was	not	the	same	pressure	to	reflect	on	the	gendered	implications	of	austerity	as	on	the	other	failures	of	austerity.		
Conclusion		This	paper	has	shown	how	gender	considerations	were	excluded	in	such	a	way	as	to	contribute	to	the	coherence	of	austerity	as	a	policy.	I	have	argued	that	austerity	is	gendered,	not	only	in	its	outcomes,	but	also	in	the	very	assumptions	on	which	it	is	based.	Moving	forward,	while	the	EU	and	other	institutions	may	shy	away	from	using	the	label	of	austerity,	and	while	there	may	be	some	more	space	for	debate	over	the	economics	of	austerity,	the	key	mechanisms	and	standards	of	austerity	are	being	normalised	and	even	incorporated	into	the	constitutions	of	member	states	in	the	EU.	The	structural	reforms	and	convergence	aims	of	the	European	Semester	remain	deeply	connected	to	the	underpinning	ideas	of	austerity.	As	such,	understanding	austerity	is	crucial	for	understanding	European	Economic	Governance.	Further,	by	exploring	how	gender	plays	a	role	in	the	discourses	of	austerity,	it	becomes	possible	to	see	some	of	the	dynamics	of	European	integration	in	a	different	light.	In	particular,	in	understanding	the	interaction	between	‘social’	and	‘economic’	policies	at	the	European	level,	an	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	of	silencing	and	obfuscation	discussed	in	this	paper	can	only	help	to	improve	our	analysis.			In	particular,	it	is	important	that	discussions	of	austerity,	and	of	European	economic	policy	more	broadly,	do	not	continue	to	exclude	any	discussion	of	gender.	As	this	paper	has	argued,	gender	influences	both	the	construction	and	application	of	austerity.	It	is	the	very	absence	of	any	gender	analysis	that	helps	to	make	austerity	seem	both	
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legitimate	and	coherent.	As	such,	it	remains	in	the	interest	of	EU	economic	policy	makers	to	keep	gender	concerns	excluded	from	debates	on	economic	governance.	While	it	seems	clear	that	such	policy	makers	will	continue	to	act	as	though	the	economy	is	not	gendered,	and	continue	to	discuss	economic	policy	without	any	reference	to	gender,	what	is	still	to	be	seen	is	whether	other	actors	involved	in	such	discussions	and	debates	continue	to	follow	that	path	also.	Ignoring	the	feminist	critiques	weakened	the	opponents	of	austerity,	and	continuing	to	do	so	will	limit	any	future	constructive	engagements	with	EU	economic	policy.			 	
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